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NOTES
THE CIVrI RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
RAcIAL DIScImMINATIoN BY LAiBOR UNIONS
On May 1, 1963, in New York City, a fifty-story office building
was being constructed. Out of the one hundred structural steel-
workers, masons and carpenters employed, not one was a Negro.
On the same day in Milwaukee, eighty-three carpenters, nineteen
electricians, and fourteen workers in the plumbing, pipefitting and
operating trades were engaged in the construction of a hospital; only
four were Negroes.' In February of 1966, the five construction
and building trade unions in St. Louis had a combined membership
of 5,000; only three were Negroes.2 In 1962, eleven percent of
the labor force was non-white; yet twenty-two percent of the un-
employed were Negro.' The median income of the white male
worker in 1960 was $5,137; for the non-white it was $3,075.'
More recent reports indicate that the relative position of the Negro
in the economy has improved only slightly, if at all.5
While the causes of the inferior position of the Negro are
deeply rooted in American history,6 undoubtedly, the major factor
has been the denial of equal employment opportunities.7 This in
turn has been somewhat attributed to the discriminatory practice
of various institutions which have acquired extensive control over
employment.8 Of these groups, it is generally accepted that racial
'REPORTS ON APPRENTICESHIP BY THE ADVISORY CommIrTTEEs TO T3E
UNITED STATES CommisSoI ON CVIL RIGHTS 1 (1964) (hereinafter cited
as APPRENTICESHIP REPORTS).
2 N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1966, p. 1, col. 1.3 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2513 (1964).
4 Id. at 2514.
5 Non-white families had a median income of $3,330 in 1962. KHEEL,
GUIDE TO FAr EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES 2 (1964). In 1963, 5.7% of the
work force was unemployed as compared with 10.9% of the Negroes. At the
beginning of 1964, four million were unemployed, of whom one million were
Negroes. YouNG, To BE EgUAL. 53, 82 (1964). In February, 1966, 3.7% of
the total labor force, including 7% of the Negro work force was unem-
ployed. N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1966, § 4, p. 6, col. 2-4.
6 See generally GINZBERG, THE NEGRO POTmNTIAL (1956).
7 See PErMGREw, A PROFILE OF THE NEGRO AmERicA.N 168-76 (1964);
REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CivI. RIGHTS 73-91 (1963)
(hereinafter cited as Crv. RIGHTS COMm.).
8 See NoRGREN & HILL, TowARD FAIR EMPLOYMENT 17-55 (1964). Cf.
Friedmann, Corporate Power, Government by Private Groups, and the Law,
57 COLUM. L. REv. 155, 175-86 (1957)."
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discrimination by numerous labor organizations has been an important
determinant of the economic gap between the Negro and white
communities. 9 During the last twenty years, federal legislation
has been enacted in an attempt to regulate union activity, 0 and
many states now have Fair Employment Practice Laws (hereinafter
referred to as FEP) that provide for administrative agencies (here-
inafter referred to as FEPC) which investigate and attempt to
eliminate discrimination in employment.1 ' On the federal level, one
of the more recent attempts to eliminate union discrimination is con-
tained in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,'1 believed to be
the most comprehensive civil rights legislation ever enacted by
Congress.1
3
The purpose of this note is to examine the labor organiza-
tion provisions and enforcement procedures of Title VII in order
to determine to what extent, if any, they will aid in providing
equal employment opportunities for Negroes. This will be
done by discussing the major methods of discrimination em-
ployed by unions and the resultant effect they have had on the
current status of the Negro. The data derived therefrom will
then make more meaningful the critique of the prohibitions
and remedies available under Title VII. In concluding, a brief
9 See Gould, The Negro Revolution and the Law of Collective Bargain-
ing, 34 FoRDHAu L. Ray. 207-10 (1965); Sovern, The National Labor
Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 CoLum. L. Rzv. 563-67 (1962).
There is no intent to imply that racial discrimination in employment involves
only labor unions; indeed, many believe the role of management to be greater
in this respect. E.g., NORGpRE & Hmr, op. cit. supra note 8, at 40; Sovern
supra at 565-66.
10 See The Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61
Stat 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1964) ; The Railway Labor
Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1964). For a dis-
cussion of federal legislation dealing specifically with racial discrimination
by labor unions see Hickey, Government Regulation of Union Racial Poli-
cies, 7 B.C. INDusT. & Comimi. L. Rav. 191 (1966).
"For a compilation of state FEP laws see CCH EmpLoYMENT PRAC.
GumE, State Laws, 1965 11120,200, 29,200.
1278 Stat 253, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
The act contains three sections which specifically limit labor union activity.
It shall be unlawful employment practice for a labor organization-
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discri-
minate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin;
(2) to limit, segregate, or to classify its membership . . . or refuse
to refer for employment any individual, in any way which would...
adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, color . . . or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against
an individual in violation of this section. 78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-
2(c) (1)-(3) (1964).
1 Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under The Civil Rights Act of
1964, 31 BRooxLYr L. REv. 62 (1964).
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attempt ivill be made-to define the duty and limits of the law
in creating equal employment opportunities for Negroes.
Methods of Discrimination
In the discussion that follows, it will be significant to
remember 'that Negroes have not been the only group affected
by union discrimination.14 However, since the Negro has been
the nation's largest and most disadvantaged minority,:5 his con-
dition will serve as the basis of this analysis. It is also im-
portant to bear in mind that many of the union practices to be
discussed have not been deliberately directed against the Negro,
but rather, in favor of others or in order to achieve such
objectives as job security. 6 Regardless of the intent, such
activities constitute discrimination in that they have adversely
affected the employment oppqrtunities of the Negro.
In order to illuminate its effects, and for subsequent refer-
ence, union discrimination will be discussed in two contexts:
(1) when union action precludes the Negro from obtaining
employment by denying him membership in the union; and (2)
when union action affects the Negro who is already employed,
regardless of union membership.
Exclusionary Methods
The power of a union to discriminate in employment by
denying membership is greatest when an employer depends upon
the union for his supply of labor. For this reason, exclusionary
methods are more consequential in the craft unions where
employment is traditionally sporadic, and where employers are
unable to employ a permanent labor force. This is especially
true in the building trades where employees are recruited
from large labor pools controlled by the union. Due to the
fact that union membership provides employment and the
worker's contact with his employer is limited, the employee
tends to associate more with the union which represents job
security. For these and other reasons, such unions become
tight-knit and united against outside interference.' 7
14 Representatives of the Mexican-American Community have argued that
non-Negro minority groups have been neglected since legislation has been
primarily aimed at the Negro. CCH EMPOYMENT PRAc. GuiDE, New De-
velopments, 1965 § 8009 at 6023.
15 For statistics'.on. Negro workers see 2 U.S. CoDE Co G.,-& AD. NEws
2513-17 (1964) ; Civ. R GHTS Com., op. cit. mtpra note 7, at 83-90; YouNG,
op. cit. mipra note 5, at 73-74. ,
i6 Summers, The Right to Join a Union, 47 COLUm. L. REv. 33, 35-36
(1947).
. Ibid. See APPRENTICESHIP REMORTS 112-14 (1964>.
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(1) The Caucasian Clause
In the past, union constitutions often contained provisions
limiting membership to Caucasians.18 This open exclusion of
the Negro was, to some degree, encouraged by the "voluntary
association" doctrine established by the courts, which analo-
gized unions to private clubs.19 With the growth of labor
unions during the 1930's, the application of the "voluntary
association" doctrine became impractical, and the courts began
to recognize the quasi-public nature of the union. 0 This, along
with the labor movement's effort to gain public support, prob-
ably explains why the "Caucasian clause" is no longer used.2 '
(2) Testing
However, the removal of racial bars in union constitutions
did not result in the elimination of discrimination. Instead,
subtler methods, such as the discriminatory administration of
admissions examinations, began to be utilized. The union
admissions committees had complete control and could interpret
the results of the examination so as to exclude certain minori-
ties.22 This device had added significance in the skilled crafts
where the passing of an apprenticeship examination was usually
a prerequisite for union membership.23  Whether such practices
continue at the present time is difficult to ascertain since no
test is entirely objective, and, in the final analysis, the intent
of the administrator will determine the purpose for which test-
ing is used. It is also possible that many entrance examina-
tions are discriminatory per se since they contain certain ques-
tions which the non-white may be unable to answer due to his cul-
tural background and the previous discrimination to which he has
been subjected.2 4
Is NORGREx & HmIn, op. cit. supra note 8, at 41; Summers, supra note 16,
at 33-34.
19 Comment, Union Membership: Privilege or Right?, 27. WAsiE. L. Rnv.
211-14 (1952).2 james v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 731, 155 P.2d 329, 335
(1944); Summers, supra note 16, at 40-42.
21 See Hill, Twenty Years of State Fair Employitent Practice Commis-
sions: A Critical Analysis With Recommendations, 14 BUFFALO L. R v.
22, 65 (1964).
22 Summers, supra note 16, at 35.
23 For a report on entrance procedures in various New Jersey unions see
APPRENricEsHip REPORTS 94-99 (1964).
24 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRAP. Gum, New Developments, 1965 1 8009 at
6022. Modem testing techniques are geared to compensate for the cultural
and environmental background of the Negro. Studies have proved that -a
poor- environment can adversely affect an individual's -performance on many
I.Q. tests. See Pzmmcaw, op. cit. mpra note 7, at 100-35.
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(3) Nepotism
Closely related to testing was the practice of "nepotism."
Benjamin Franklin's remark that "he that hath a trade hath an
estate" aptly illustrates the belief, which was prevalent among
the skilled craftsmen, that the right to work was a property
right which could be passed on through his estate .2  This atti-
tude was reflected by the "grandfather clauses" inserted in
many craft-union constitutions which gave admission priority
to the sons, relatives, or nominees of present members, and
resulted in the preservation of the all-white membership of the
union.2 o An alternate method which achieved an identical
result was a provision which required any applicant for admis-
sion to be sponsored by a union member.2 7  Studies indicate
that "nepotism" is still common among many small craft
unions.2 8  This preferential treatment has been justified by
reasoning that such favoritism is intended to benefit union
members rather than to discriminate against others.2 9 Such
logic was criticized in a recent New York decision which stated
that "filial preference is contrary to modern day societal objec-
tives concerning job qualifications. . . Admission . . . based
exclusively upon the applicant's qualifications to perform. . . as
determined by objective criteria is to be encouraged." 30 This
is an emerging view, and hopefully other jurisdictions will
follow suit.
Job Control
(1) The Hiring Hall
Once a Negro is excluded from union membership, his
subsequent deprivation of. employment opportunity will depend
on how effectively the union controls job access. Prior to
1947, job control could be maintained through a closed-shop
agreement whereby an individual not a union member was
unable to obtain employment. 3' This device was invalidated by
25 Strauss & Ingerman, Public Policy and Discrimination in Apprentice-
siip, 16 HASTINGS L.J. 285, 304 (1965).
26 Hill, s pra note 21, at 65-66. Professor Hill advocates the recognition
of these clauses as prima facie evidence of discrimination.
27 See NoRGRE & HILL, op. cit. supra note 8, at 45-46.
2 APPRENTicE:sIp REPoRTs 73-75 (1964).
29 Cf. Strauss & Ingerman, supra note 25, at 304-05.
s State Comim'n For Human Rights v. Farrell, 43 Misc. 2d 958, 965, 252
N.Y.S.2d 649, 657 (Sup. Ct. 1964). In this case the court upheld the Com-
mission's demand that the sheet metal workers union set up objective criteria
for admission. The Commissioner found that the union had no Negro mem-
bers, and that 80% of the apprentices were related to union members.
-3 Comment, pupra note 19, at 214-17.
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the Taft-Hartley Act and was replaced by the "hiring hail." 2
The hiring hall developed, under union control, in the maritime
and construction trades, among others, to eliminate the hard-
ships created by the sporadic and temporary nature of employ-
ment and to provide a dependable supply of manpower.3
Agreements were made under which employers became bound to ac-
cept only applicants referred to them by the union hiring hall,
and if this exclusive hiring hall was restricted to union members,
a de facto closed shop resulted.3 Today, an exclusive hiring
hall is valid if the agreement prohibits discrimination based
upon union membership and is maintained for the benefit of all
individuals seeking employment.3 5  However, due to the very
nature of its operation, the exclusive hiring hall may continue
to deprive the Negro of employment opportunities. This is
particularly true when workers are referred on the basis of
seniority.38 Such an arrangement provides jobs during the
slack periods mainly to those who have received substantial
employment in the past, in most instances union members. Job
opportunities for those who have received little or no employ-
ment in the past, in most instances non-union Negroes, are
limited to the active periods. Thus, the Negro is unable to
build any meaningful seniority for the future due to the rela-
tively small amount of employment he receives. In New York,
for example, it was reported that many unions in the building
trades recruit out of town workers rather than hire local
Negroes.3 7 In addition, union members are most often apprised
of job opportunities for the reason that little is done to publicize
openings outside of the hiring hall.38
(2) Apprenticeship Training
The method by which skilled craft unions have been most
successful in controlling employment opportunities has been
through apprenticeship training.3 9 The significance of such
32The Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat.
140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3), (b) (2) (1964).3 3 NORGREx & HuIm, op. cit. supra note 8, at 47.
34 See Mountain Pac. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc.,
119 N.L.R.B. 883, 893-96 (1957), re'zid, 270 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1959); -ill,
supra note 21, at 60-61.
3SLocal 357, Intel Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
36 See, e.g., id. at 668-69.
37 Hill, supra note 21, at 64.
38 Compare Strauss & Ingerman, Public Policy and Discrimination In
,Apprenticeship, 16 HASTMGs L.J. 285, ,293-95 (1965).
39 See APPRENTCmcsHP REoRs 2,-4 (1964); Strauss & Ingerman, .supra
note 38, at 285-86.
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lralning is': hat it qiialifie , workers"for journeymnan status whidh
is-a prerequisite for irirfuall any-job in the skilled--trades."0
1I-onbcdlly, the Sotitl was the -traditional traifing " rotind for
N-gro craftsmenbibut in the early part of the.tw.entieth 6enfury
ti e -number of N~gro apprentices in the South declined. When
the Negro migrated North, the situation became worse because
Negroes were not initially trained and thus Negro journeymen
were not available to train Negro apprentices.:1 Unions had
complete control over the training program, and thus, the number
of-Negro apprentices was limited by such devices as "grand-
father clauses" and discriminatory entrance examinations.4
2
This condition was reflected in the 1960 census which reported
that only 3.3 percent of the apprentices in this country were
Negro. In New York and California, the two leading industrial
states, the percentage was lower.43
In recent years, a great deal of state and federal legislat.
tion has been enacted to deal with the problem of discrimina-
-tion in apprenticeship training. Today, many apprenticeship
-programs have been set up under joint union-management
-control and are supported-by government funds."4 The Secre-
tary of Labor delegated to the Bureau of Apprenticeship and
-Training the power to review apprenficesip programs in order to in-
,sure that they are not discriminatory, and to register only those pro-
grains which satisfy its requirements.45 State laws prohibit discrimin-
ation in apprenticeship training and the FEPC investigates charges of
racial discrimination." Federal funds have also been made available
to vocational high schools which train Negro youths in the skilled
trades" In addition, jobs in this area are plentiful and the predic-
tion for the future is that many more skilled craftsmen will be
needed.48 Yet, reports show that Negroes are being excluded from
the expanding electrical, pipe, and metal trades and have found
work mainly in the trowel trades, carpentry, and painting where
employnent has either been growing slowly or diminishing during
40 APPa nIcEsmP REIPORTS 94, 120-21 (1964). - -
41 Strauss & Sngerman, supra note 38, at 287-91. See Wbheler, The Impact
of Rdce, Relations on Industrzal Relations sip the South, 15 LAB. L.J. 474,
476-78 '(1964).
_42 Hill, supra note 21, at 76-78.
"43 Strauss & Ingerman, supra note 38, at 28546.
"4"AppPNricEsmP REPORTS 5-12 (1964).
45KHEEL, GuIDE To FAIR EmPLoYMENT PRAcTiCEs 53-54 (1964).
46 See, e4., State Comm'n For Human Rights v. Farrell, supra note 30.
See also Todd v. Joint Apprenticeship Comm., 223 F Supp. 12 (N.D. Ill.
,1963), vacated, as igqtpt, 332 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 1964), ceit. denied, 380 U.S.
914 (1965). -
."7 Pollitt, Ractal Discrtminatior in Employment" Proposals for Corrective
Action, 13 BUrFALO L. Rtv. 59, 80-83 (1963).AId. at 76.
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te past decade.49 -The reports of the White House Conference on.
Equal Employment Opportunity demonstrate that there has been
no significant increase in the number of minority group apprentices 50
One of the reasons for this tragic failure has been the lack of
initiative and enforcement powers of the state agencies 5 1 dealing
with the problem. These agencies have not taken the affirmatiye
action necessary to deal with the tradition of racial discrimination
that has now become highly institutionalized- on the level of the small
shop and local union.5 2 Even where the Negro does gain admission
to an apprenticeship program, the need for supervision remains
because the speed with which he learns will depend, in large measure,
on the quality of the training he receives51 Due to the fact that
apprenticeship wages are small, the Negro may be forced to seek
more profitable employment elsewhere. In addition, Negro youths
are graduating from government supported vocational schools only
to find the skilled crafts closed to them because of union-management
agreements whereby the number of apprenticeship openings is regu-
lated by a ratio of apprentices to journeymen, rather than by current
demand. Finally, and most significantly, the Negro is being ex-
cluded from the growing skilled-crafts because of his failure to
apply for apprenticeship programs, which has been attributed-to the
Negro's lack of information concerning the procedure of application.
Such information is usually available only to the white friends
and relatives of the union members, and little effort is made by
unions to publicize available apprenticeships.55 Also, due to previous
discrimination, the Negro does not envision a skilled trade as a
potential vocation.( In many instances where the Negro does apply
for, apprenticeship training, he lacks the qualifications. To be eligible
for most apprenticeship programs the applicant must now have a
lugh school diploma and must pass a formal screening examination
which usually stresses knowledge of elementary mathematics. Negro
drop-outs and students of segregated schools normally cannot meet
-
9 Id. at 76-77, Strauss & Ingerman, sutpra note- 38, at 291,
50 CCH E, LOYIENT PRAc. Gulm, New Developments, 1965 118009 at
020.-
51 Hill, Twenty Years of State Fair Employment Con'mimssions: A Critical
Analysis With Recommendations, 14 BVALo L. RIv. 22, 23-25 (1964).52 d. at 61. The Ndw Yrk Apprenticeship- Council, created to promote
an orderly development and supply of skilled journeymen, has been reported
to be reluctant- to- raise-the- issue- of- mmority--representation -n- apprenticeship
because of the fear that labor-management may no longer register with-the
Council. AMENTiCEsnI- REPoRTs 121 (1964). -
53 Strauss & Ingerman, supra note 38, at 298.5dAPPRENTC cE s3iP REPoRTs- 120-21 (1964),. ' See Hill, supra note 51,
at 65.55 traups & Ingerman, ,supra .note 38, at 293-94, APP=EtTICESHiP REPorS
26 (1964). . 1-
56 Strauss 4 Ingerman; supra note Pj at- 292.
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these requirements.57 Thus, the pendulum of discrimination com-
pletes its swing: the Negro fails to qualify or apply for apprentice-
ship training due to past discrimination; when skilled jobs do become
available, there are consequently few qualified Negroes available to
fill them. Whether denial of employment under these circumstances
constitutes legal discrimination, and, if so, what can be done to
remedy the situation, may well determine the future effectiveness
of the law in providing equal employment opportunities for the
Negro.
On the Job Discrimination
(1) The Collective Bargaining Process
In the industrial complex (as contrasted to the construction
trades where the hiring hall has provided the employees) manage-
ment has usually done the hiring and, as a result, the ability of the
union to control job access, and thus limit employment through
denial of union membership, has been less effectual.58 In this
situation, the union stands to gain more from granting membership
to the Negro after he has gained employment, and relegating him
to lower paying jobs through a collective bargaining agreement with
the employer.5" The problem of racial discrimination in industrial
unions has been due, in part, to the nature of the collective bargaining
process.
Pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act, the bargaining
representative chosen by a majority of the employees in a unit has
"exclusive authority," during the bargaining process, to represent all
the employees in that unit, whether or not they are members of the
union.60 The reason for granting "exclusive authority" is to foster
collective bargaining by superseding all individual contracts between
the employee and employer. 1 For the purposes of this discussion,
the importance of the collective bargaining process is that it controls
the vital areas of grievance procedure and seniority.
(1) (a) Grievance Procedure
Generally, the grievance procedure is "a means of making deci-
sions about disputes that arise either out of the meaning and applica-
tion of principles spelled out in the basic [collective bargaining]
57 Id. at 295.58 NORGREN & Hiu, TowARD FAIR EMPLOYMENT 47-48 (1964); YOUNG,
To BE EQUAL 75-76 (1964).
59 This procedure has been most prevalent in the southern states. YOUNG,
op. cil. =pra note 58, at 75-77.
6049 Stat. 453 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964); Wallace Corp. v.
NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1944).61 See J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338-39 (1943).
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agreement or from a problematic aspect of the relationship between
management and employees not covered by the agreement." 6 2
Under the bargaining agreement, a grievance committee is set up to
process all employee complaints against management. In many
instances, these committees have demonstrated little interest in the
welfare of the non-union or minority union members who have
usually been Negroes. 63 This has led to a refusal or a less vigorous
attempt to press Negro complaints against management." Although
the National Labor Relations Board is empowered to grant relief in
such instances of racial discrimination,. 5 these practices may be diffi-
cult to prove due to their subtle nature.
(1) (b) Seniority
Basically, seniority is a system whereby the oldest man in point
of service, ability and fitness for the job is given the choice of jobs,
is first promoted within the range of jobs subject to his seniority
line, and is last laid off.66 In the past, through the collective
bargaining system, unions have obtained racially separate seniority
lines which have limited the Negroes to the poorer paying and
unskilled work.1'7 Thus, the -Negroes were unable to transfer to
better jobs, and were often paid lower wages for the same work.6 8
(2) The Segregated Local
One method whereby the collective bargaining apparatus is
utilized as a means of discrimination is the practice of segregating
Negroes into separate locals, as exemplified by the southern railroad
industry. 0 At first, auxiliary locals composed entirely of Negroes
were set up, and their affairs conducted by a white local.7 0  Under
62 Blaine, Hagburg & Frederick, The Grievance Procedure and Its
Application in the United States Postal Service, 15 LAB. L.J. 725, 726
(1964).
63 Summers, The Right to Join a Union, 47 CoLumt. L. REv. 33, 51-52(1947).
64 Id. at 51-53; KHEEL, GUIDE To FAIR EmPLOYMENT PRACTICES 51
(1964).
c5 E.g., Independent Metal Workers Union, Local 1, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573
(1964). For a discussion of the duty of "fair representation" imposed upon
collective bargaining agents by the National Labor Relations Act see Cox,
The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 ViT.T. L. REv. 151 (1957); Herring,
The "Fair Representation" Doctrine: An Effective Weapon Against Union
Racial Discrimination? 24 MD. L. REv. 113 (1964).
66 See Gunther v. San Diego & A.E. Ry., 198 F. Supp. 402, 412 (D.C.
Cal. 1961), aff'd, 336 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1964).
67 Pollitt, supra note 47, at 70.
68 KHEEI., op. cit. supra note 64, at 50; Hill, supra note 51, at 28.
GO NORGREx & HILT, op. cit. supra note 58, at 41-45.
70 Id. at 42.
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these conditions, union membership for the Negro meant little more
than an opportunity to-pay dues in order to obtain a work permit.71
In 1944, when the auxiliary local was declared illegal under certain
circumstances,72 it was replaced by the segregated local which thee-
retically gave Negroes a separate charter, the right to vote, and the
power to choose their own officers. 3 , _In practice, however, it often
operated in the same manner as the auxiliary local. The Negro local
was discriminated against by the white local in the bargaining
process, and the development of employment ghettos limited the
Negroes to the lower paying jobs.74
Due to many state FE? laws and a recent NLRB decision,7 5
segregated locals and racially separate seniority lines are gradually
passing from the labor scene today.70  However, when separate
seniority lines merge, and Negro locals are absorbed by the white
local, more complex problems arise. How should the Negro, who
has been limited to unskilled work and deprived of seniority oppor-
tunities in the past, be affected by the new seniority line to be
formed? Should seniority be dispensed with, and the Negro allowed
tO enter into any job classification for which he can qualify by passing
a competitive examination? Should he be awarded retroactive sen-
iority? To what extent should the Negro be represented on the
executive board after a merger of segregated locals? A skilled
Negro may be placed in a group of unskilled workers and be unable
to transfer to a group of skilled employees. The reverse of this
situation is also possible if the Negro is assigned to a group of
highly skilled and better educated whites, against whom he cannot
compete. In either case his job mobility will be limited.
Although racial discrimination appears to be on the wane in
industrial unions, 77 the solution to the above problems may appear
difficult when viewed in light of the collective bargaining process
and union democracy.7 8 Union policies will continue to be dictated
71 Commijent, Union Membership: Privilege or Right? 27 WAsH. L. REV.
211, 224-25 (1952); Sununers, supra note 63, at.60-61.
72james v. Efaiinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 737, 155 P.2d 329, 338
(1944).
73 YORGRE & HILl, op. cit. stpra note 58, at 43-45.
741d. at 43-45. Cf. Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, 223 F.2d 739
(8th. Cir.), rev'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 892 (1955); Independent Metal
Workers Union, Local 1, supra note 65.
- Independent Metal Workers Union, Local 1, supra note 65, at 1577,
wherein the National Labor Relations Board stated that it could not
Eonstitutionall support a union that based its eligibility for membership upon
race.
76 See NORGREN & HILL, op. cit. supra note 58, at -44.
7 Pollitt, Racial Discrimination iti Employment: Proposals For Corrective
Action, 13 BiwFAwO L. REv. 59, 71 (1963).
7s See'generally Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation:
Federal Responsibility in a Pederal System, 67 YAiz L.n . 1327,(1958).
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by white majorities, many of whom will be unwilling to relinquish
the advantageous positions they have achieved, in many instances,
at the expense of the Negro. The extent to which the law may
regulate the internal operations of unions will be limited by the
"majority will" concept of democracy. This may be an instance in
which the law cannot provide a complete answer because the solu-
tion lies basically in the process of education and in the alteration
of certain attitudes prevalent in society today.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 79 (hereinafter
referred to as the Act) is the cornerstone of a massive attack upon
discrimination. Other titles of the Act endeavor to achieve first-
class citizenship for the Negro through the elimination of racial
discrimination in voting, education and public accommodations. Title
VII reflects a realization that the right to vote has little meaning
without adequate employment opportunity, and that education is
fruitless if gainful employment is denied to the graduate s8
The Commission
The Act was born of compromise."' As originally drafted,
Title VII was to be administered by a federal agency empowered to
eliminate discriminatory practices by cease and desist orders . 2 Due
to the strenuous opposition of many congressmen, the agency was
stripped of its coercive powers, and relegated to the role of a
mediator.3  As finally enacted, the Act calls for a five-man bipartisan
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the functions of which
are: (1) to administer the provisions of the title; (2) to investigate
unlawful employment charges; and (3) to attempt to resolve disputes
through informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion s 4
A complaint may be filed with the Commission by an aggrieved
individual or by a member of the Commission, " provided a deference
79 78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964). For a general discussion of the
Act along with pertinent legislative history see CCII CIm RIGHTS AcT or
1964 WiTH EXPLANATION (1964).
802 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws 2355 (1964).
81 In the House of Representatives, the bill was debated for 64 hours,
155 amendments were offered and 34 were approved. 110 CoNc. REC. 12866
(daily ed. June 10, 1964) (remarks of Senator Dirksen).
82 See Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under The Cizil Rights
Act of 1964, 31 BROOxLYN L. REv. 62, 64-68 (1964).
8 110 CoNG. REc. 13693 (daily ed. June 17, 1964).
84 78 Stat. 258, 259, 42 U.S.C. §§ 20OOe-4, 5 (1964).
sG78 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(a)(1964). In order for a member
of the Commission to file a charge, he must have reasonable cause to believe
a violation of Title VII has occurred.
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of sixty days is observed. During this period, the petitioner must
exhaust any state or local remedy which prohibits, and establishes
means of relief from, the unlawful employment practice alleged.
The sixty days is increased to 120 days during the first year after
the effective date of such state or local law.86 After the expiration
of the deference period, an action may then be commenced before
the Commission.87 The Commission must furnish the respondent
with a copy of the complaint, and conduct a preliminary investiga-
tion in order to determine whether there is reasonable cause to
believe that the charge is true.88 Upon a determination of "reason-
able cause," the Commission must endeavor to eliminate the alleged
unlawful employment practice by methods of conference, conciliation
and persuasion.8 9
Without an enforcement arm, the ability of the Commission to
prevent future racial discrimination by labor unions appears dubious.
State FEPCs have had little success in combating discrimination
with informal methods of conciliation,90 and the grant of enforcement
powers to such agencies has been often advocated. 91 However, it is
possible that the conciliatory efforts of an agency endowed with
federal authority will command a more positive response.
Additional limitations on the power of the Commission to act
are evident throughout Title VII. Formal charges of discrimination
and the results of conciliatory efforts must be kept confidential.
92
The sanction of publicity for racial discrimination has been proposed
by many who have criticized the secretive nature of state FEPC
8678 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(b),(c) (1964). The Commission
has designated 31 states entitled to the 60 or 120 day deference based upon
a sufficient state or local remedy. CCH EmPLOYMENT PRAC. GuiD., Federal
Rules, 1966 f 17,252, at 7370.
S778 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(b)(1964). This section makes no
refeience to the petitioners' success or failure at the state level and no re-
quirement is stated other than the 60 or 120 day deference. It appears,
therefore, that an action may be brought before the Commission regardless
of what transpires on the state level. Accord, Berg, stipra note 82, at
83.
88 78 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (a) (1964).
69 Ibid.
00 E.g., Strauss & Ingerman, Public Policy and Discrimination in Ap-
prenticeship, 16 HASTINGs L.J. 285, 308-09 (1965); Feild, Hindsight and
Foresight About FEPC, 14 BUFFALO L. Rv. 16, 18 (1964).
91 Hill, Twenty Years of State Fair Employment Practice Commission: A
Critical Analysis With Recommendations, 14 BurrALo L. REv. 22, 24-25
(1964). The Chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
testified before the House Committee on Education and Labor for proposed
legislation to strengthen Title VII. This legislation would have given the
Commission a meaningful enforcement arm. CCH EmPLOYMENT PRAC.
GUIDE, New Developments, 1965 1 8024, at 6035.
9278 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5 (a) (1964).
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procedures. 3 For the purpose of investigating a charge filed, the
Commission may examine witnesses and require the production of
relevant documentary evidence;94 however, when met with a refusal,
a court order is necessary to effect compliance.95 Finally, labor
unions, employers and employment agencies subject to Title VII are
required to keep records of matters relevant to the determination of
unfair labor practices, and to make reports therefrom, as the Com-
mission prescribes. However, this section does not apply to
matters occurring in a state which has enacted an FEP law during
any period in which the party concerned is subject to such law.97
At present, thirty-nine states have fair employment laws, and thus
are exempt from the record-keeping requirements of the Commission.98
Also, in the few instances in which this provision does apply,
application may be made to the Commission, or a civil action may
be commenced in a federal court, for relief if the party required to
make the report believes the requirement would cause him undue
hardship.99
On the positive side, the Commission will be able to utilize its
incidental powers effectively. Under Title VII, an individual Com-
missioner may initiate an investigation by filing a complaint with
the Commission.'" The advantages of this provision are readily
ascertainable. In many instances, the Negro may not recognize
discrimination because of the complex economic and social structure
in which it occurs, and even when the discriminatory practice is
apparent, the Negro may fail to complain due to the potential
embarrassment, or lack of faith in legal remedies.' 0' The Commis-
03 E.g., Hill, supra note 91, at 25; Rabkin, Enforcement of Law Against
Discriminatim; in Employment, 14 BuF-FALo L. REv. 100, 111-13 (1964).
9478 Stat. 264, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-8(a), -9(a) (1964).
95 78 Stat. 264, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9(b) (1964).
9678 Stat. 262, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-8(c) (1964).
9778 Stat. 262, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-8(d) (1964). This section stipulates
FEP "law" without any qualifications. Therefore, the state is exempt regard-
less of whether its laws have record keeping requirements. Accord, Berg,
supra note 82, at 89; see 110 CoNG. REc. 12296 (daily ed. June 4, 1964).
98 CCH EmPLOYMENT PRAc. GtrnE; State Laws, 1966 1400, at 751.
9978 Stat. 262, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-8(c) (1964).
'1078 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-S(a) (1964). A member of the Com-
mission may file a complaint when he has reasonable cause to believe that a
violation of Title VII has occurred. Whether this will be given a strict or
liberal application will depend upon the Commission's interpretation of "rea-
sonable cause." See 110 CONG. REc. 12297 (daily ed. June 4, 1964). The
Commission has already stated that the fact that Negroes are not employed
at a particular plant does not justify a finding of "reasonable cause:' CCH
EMPLOYMENT PRAc. GumE, Federal Rules, 1965 1 17,251, at 7357. However,
it has also stated that a member of the Commission may conduct an inquiry
where information reliably suggests discriminatory practices. Id. 17,252, at
7367.
1'D See CCH EMPLOYMENT PRc. GUIDE, New Developments, 1965 ff 8016,
at 6027.
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sioner6 will ddve.lop'the necessary expertise, an be able to take the
affihnative action that is required to terminate the subtler methods
of discrimination', In addition, once a Commissioner 'files a corn-
plaifit, union-wide investigations may be conducted based upon the
Commissioner's power to compel the production of relevant docu-
mentary evidence and material. 10 2 The Commission will be able to
furn over the fruits of pertinent investigation to the Attorney General
or .to an aggrieved individual when a civil action is brought under
Title VII. Such use of the material is possible because the pro-
scription against publicizing refers only to the charge filed and the
conciliation efforts.1
0 3
- The Commission may also enter into concession agreements
With individual states which have effective anti-discrimination statutes
whereby the operation of Title VII would be suspended.1' 0 In
effect, the agreement would give jurisdiction over complaints arising
under Title VII to state agencies whenever the practice complained
of also. violates state or local law. 05 This would be an inducement
for local FEPCs to vigorously attack racial discrimination.
Finally, the Commission is empowered to file suit for enforce-
ment whenever it has -grounds to believe that an individual or
organization'is not complying with a federal district court order
issued under Title VII. 10  This provisiofi will enable the Commis-
sion to insure the effectiveness of court orders.
During the first one hundred days of its operation, over 1,300
complaints were filed with the Commission, 0 7 and enlightened settle-,
ments were reached in the first two cases involving labor unions. 0 8
Howeverthe -stubborn resistance of hard-core racial discrimination.
that is sure to be encountered in the future may exemplify the
need for enforcement powers within the Commission.
Civil Actions in the Federal District Courts
The coercive enforcement of Title VII is achieved via the
federal district courts which may grant "such affirmative relief as
may be appropriate," including injunction, reinstatement, and back
10278 Stat 262, 264, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-8'(a), -9(a) (1964).
1378 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1964). See 110 CONG. REc. 12297
(daily ed. June 4, 1964). The Commission is also prohibited from making
public any evidence obtained prior to the institution of a proceeding under
Title VII, 78 Stat. 262, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(.e) (1964).
. 10478 Stat. 262, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-8(b) (1964). The Commission may
rescind this agreement if it determines that it no longer serves the interest
of the effective enforcement of Title' VII.
105 110 CONG. Rzc. 12295-96 (daily ed. June 4, 1964).
106 78 Stat. 259, 42 •U.S.C. § 2000e-5(i) (1964).
1 07 CCH EPLOYMETN PRAc. GuIDz New Developments, 1965 f, 80?4.
'
08 1d. 111 8021, 8023.
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pay. 0 9 The court may also appoint an attorney for the aggrieved
individual, authorize the conmwncement of an action without the
payment of fees, costs or security,110 and award attorney's fees to
the prevailing party."'
"Such affirmative relief as may be appropriate" delegates to
the courts broad discretion in the formulation of remedies. Court
orders could be issued enjoining a union from acting as the exclusive
bargaining agent of the employees until it can show that it no longer
engages in discriminatory practices. Unions might also be ordered
to set up objective standards for admission and to cease and desist
from utilizing customary entrance requirements which have dis-
criminated against Negroes."
x2
(1) Individual Suits
If the Commission has been unable to obtain voluntary compli-
ance within thirty days (or sixty days if the Commission determines
it necessary) after a charge is filed, it must notify the aggrieved
individual who then has thirty days to commence a civil action in
the appropriate federal court." 3 If the original complaint was filed
by a member of the Commission, the action may be brought by any
person alleged to be aggrieved by the charge." 4 The Commission
may not prosecute a complaint in the courts,"6 and from the plain
wording of the statute, it appears that state and Commission remedies
must be exhausted before a civil action can be commenced." 6
10978 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(g) (1964).
11078 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1964).
11178 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C. § 2 000e-5(k) (1964). This section, though,
does not provide attorney's fees where either the United States or the Com-
mission is the prevailing party.
112 See Hickey, Government Regulation of Union Racial Policies, 7 B.C.
INDU s. & Coism. L. REv. 191, 216-18 (1966). But see, 110 CoNG. REc. 6986
(daily ed. April 8, 1964) ("No court order issued under Title VII could
affect the status of a labor organization under the National Labor Relations
Act. . . !").
-13 78 Stat 259, 42 U.S.C. § 2 000e-5(e) (1964). The 30-day allowance for
the bringing of a civil action does not commence until notice is given.
114The statute states that Commission proceedings and civil actions may
be brought by aggrieved "persons." 78 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(a), (e)
(1964). This would appear to provide for suits by organizations because
"person" is defined under Title VII as including, among others, one or more
individuals, labor organizations and associations. 78 Stat 253, 42 U.S.C.
§2000e(a) (1964). However, it has been reported that the Commission
refused to process a complaint filed by a labor union on the ground that
only aggrieved individuals could take such action. N.Y. Times, March 11,
1966, p. 19, col. 1.
125 See 110 CONG. Rsc. 13693 (daily ed. June 17, 1964). The Commission
has stated that it will attempt to intervene or appear as amicus curiae in
certain civil actions brought under Title VII. CCH EmPLOYMENT PRAC.
GuirF, Federal Rules, 1966 17,252, at 7369.
.160Accord, Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity U-ner The Civil Rights
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Under Title VII, civil actions by individuals may well play a
small role in the prevention of racial discrimination by labor unions.
Comprehensive proscriptions against discrimination have long existed
under the National Labor Relations Act, but the expense and delay
of the judicial system have seriously limited the enforcement of
these laws."17  Furthermore, the cumbersome procedural sequence
that must be followed before bringing a civil action under Title VII
will serve to diminish the attractiveness of judicial proceedings.""
An individual who has failed to obtain relief on the state level and
before the Commission may be reluctant to invest the time and
possible expense of a civil action."19
(2) Attorney General's Suits
The Attorney General of the United States, with the permission
of a federal court, may intervene in a private suit of "general public
importance."' 20  Provided "general public importance" is given a
Act of 1964, 31 BRoox-LY L. Riv. 62, 83 (1964). Contra, 110 CoNG. REC.
13694 (daily ed. June 17, 1964). Even if the Commission does not find
"reasonable cause to believe the charge is true," the aggrieved party may
still bring a civil action. CCH EmPLOYMENT PRAc. Gum; Federal Rules,
1966 17,252, at 7369.
"17 See Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Adminis-
trative and Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MffIcH. L.
REv. 1435, 1514 (1963) ; Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representa-
tion: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327, 1339
(1958). For a specific example of protracted delay see Thompson v. Brother-
hood of Sleeping Car Porters, 316 F.2d 191, 192 n.1 (4th Cir. 1963).
118 The complex procedure an individual must follow before bringing a civil
action under Title VII is summarized as follows:
(a) where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurs in a state
that has its own FEP law, notice and a 60 or 120-day deference must be
given to a proper state agency;
(b) after the deference period has expired, or the state proceedings
have terminated, whichever is earlier, a charge may be filed before the
Commission, in writing and under oath, within 210 days after the alleged
unlawful practice occurred or 30 days after notice has been received that
the state proceeding has ended, whichever is earlier;
(c) if the state has no FEP law, a deference is not given and the
charge must be filed before the Commission within 90 days after the alleged
unlawful practice occurred;
(d) if the Commission is unable to obtain compliance within 30 days
after the charge is filed, or 60 days if further efforts are warranted, a civil
action may be commenced;
(e) the federal court may then, in its discretion, stay proceedings up to
60 days pending efforts by the Commission or state agency to obtain volun-
tary compliance. 78 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(a)-(e) (1964).
"19 The court may allow the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee.
78 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (k) (1964). A survey indicated that very
fc'- cases resulted in court action under state FEP laws. See chart 110
CoNG. REC. 6987 (daily ed. April 8, 1964).
12078 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(e) (1964).
[ VOL. 41
liberal interpretation, this provision will assist indigent plaintiffs in
many instances by relieving them of the burden of litigation.
More broadly based is the Attorney General's power to initiate
a civil action when he has reasonable cause to believe that any
person or group is engaged in a "pattern or practice of resistance"
to the full enjoyment of the rights protected by Title VII, and
that the pattern or practice is of such a nature, and is intended,
to deny the full exercise of those rights.12' The Attorney General
may go directly to the federal court since there is no requirement
of prior deference to state agencies or to the Commission as in the
case of a suit by an individual.1 22 An application may be made for
a three-judge court if it is certified that the action is of "general
public importance,"' 2 3 and the case must be assigned for hearing at
the earliest practicable date and be expedited in every way.'1 24
The Attorney General may request such relief as he deems necessary,
including a permanent or temporary injunction and a restraining
order. '
2 5
These provisions of Title VII could, to a certain extent, cure
the Commission's lack of enforcement powers. Working with the
Commission, the Attorney General may gather statistical data which
will aid in prosecuting labor organizations that maintain a practice
of discrimination against Negroes.126  Such actions would be more
effective than individual suits which seek to remedy isolated acts
rather than the system which facilitates the discrimination.
2 7
The extent of the relief which federal courts may grant when a
"pattern or practice" exists is uncertain. A strict construction of
the statute would indicate that remedies are limited to the prevention
of the discriminatory acts proved,1M but a liberal interpretation
12178 Stat 261, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (a) (1964).
122 See 110 CoNG. REC. 12298 (daily ed. June 4, 1964). The Attorney
General is also free to make a referral to the Commission as an aggrieved
party. Ibid.
123 78 Stat. 261, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(b) (1964).
124 This mandate may mitigate the delay often characteristic of civil actions
under the National Labor Relations Act. Supra note 117.52373 Stat. 261, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-6(a) (1964)
128 See text accompanying footnotes 100-03 supra.
127 Affirmative action based upon pattern-centered approaches instead of
individual complaint procedures has been proposed to make state FEPCs more
effective. Hill, Twenty Years of State Fair Emplo3nnent Practice Commis-
sions: A Critical Analysis With Recommendations, 14 BtmrALo L. REv. 22,
24-25 (1964). It has also been suggested that whenever conciliation fails,
the Commission should automatically refer the complaint to the Attorney
General for a civil action. CCII EMPLOYMENT PRac. GutID, New Develop-
ments, 1965 8009, at 6016.
12SThe statute authorizes the Attorney General to request "such relief,
including . . . a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order or
other order against the person . . . responsible . . . as he deems necessary
to insure the full enjoyment of the rights. . . " under Title VII, 78 Stat.
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Would enable the courts to give direct aid, such as back pay or
reinstatement, to any aggrieved individual regardless of whether he
is a formal party to the Attorney General's suit.
2 9
The proof that will be necessary to constitute a "pattern or
practice of resistance" to Title VII is also an open question. How-
ever, it is certain that more than a single act will be necessary.
Senator Humphrey, a sponsor of the Senate bill, stated that the
language of the statute "is meant to exclude action in sporadic
instances of violations of rights, which will be left to correction by
individual complainants. .. ." 130 He added that such a pattern or
practice would exist "only when the denial of rights consists of
something more than an isolated, sporadic incident, but is repeated,
routine, or of a generalized nature.1
31
On February 4, 1966, the first "pattern or practice of resistance"
suit was brought against five construction and building trade unions
in St. Louis. The unions' combined membership of five thousand
persons included only three Negroes. 13 2  The continuance of this
type of affirmative action by the Attorney General may do much to
fulfill the policies advocated by the original framers of Title VII.u3
The Substantive Law
Labor organizations subject to Title VII are forbidden to
deny membership because of race, color, religion, sex or national
origin or to discriminate in membership, or in any other way that
would adversely affect an individual's status as an applicant for
employment. T'3 This status includes apprenticeship or membership
in other training programs. 135  Unions are also prohibited from
attempting to cause an employer to discriminate, or from themselves
discriminating against an individual because he has opposed an
261, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-6(a) (1964). (Emphasis added.) An order against
the person responsible could be construed to negate any relief for an
aggrieved party. However, "or other order" may be susceptible to a broad
application.
129If relief is given to any individual aggrieved by the "pattern or
practice," complainants may be encouraged to bypass state agencies and the
Commission and request the Attorney General to bring suit.
L30 110 CONG. REc. 13745 (daily ed. June 17, 1964).
131 110 CONG. REc. 13776 (daily ed. June 18, 1964).
132 N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1966, p. 1, col. 1.
133As originally drafted, Title VII empowered the Commission to issue
cease and desist orders. See Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BROOKLYN L. REv. 62, 64-68 (1964).
Under the House of Representatives' version of Title VII, the Commission
would have been able to bring suit for relief in the federal courts if
conciliation failed. 110 CoNG. REc. 12296 (daily ed. June 4, 1964).
134 78 Stat 255, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1), (2) (1964).
'35 78 Stat 255, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (1964).
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unlawful practice or cooperated in an investigation or proceeding
under the Act. 3 "
The above proscriptions are so comprehensive that they may
be construed to bar all discrimination in membership or all activities
which limit employment opportunities. 3 7  This would include segre-
gated locals, racially separate seniority lines, 3  discriminatory
entrance examinations 13 and any other arbitrary method of differen-
tiation by labor unions. The opponents of Title VII feared that
the broad language of this section would effectively prohibit valuable
methods by which unions evaluate employment skills, and also
would mandate the admission of minority groups on the basis of
quotas in order to rectify existing imbalances in union membership.
40
To allay this apprehensiveness, various exceptions and clarifying
provisions were appended to Title VII.
(1) The Requirement of Intent
The House of Representatives' bill was amended in the Senate
to require a showing of intent in order to sustain a violation of
Title VII. 14 ' This was to insure "that inadvertent or accidental
discrimination will not violate the title. . . ." 1'2 If the federal
courts decide that direct evidence is necessary to prove intentional
discrimination, the plaintiff's burden may be onerous. However,
this appears unlikely, and intent will probably be inferred from
circumstantial evidence.' 4  For instance, although the fact that a
union has few Negro members will not alone sustain an inference
of intent, the Negro plaintiff may fulfill his burden of proof if he
also shows that he is qualified for admission and has been rejected.
It should then be incumbent upon the union to come forward and
rebut the inference of intent to discriminate by showing a valid
reason for its refusal to admit.
136 78 Stat. 257, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (a) (1964).
37 See Hickey, supra note 112, at 202.
-3 CCH EmPLOYMENT PRAc. GUIDE, Newv Developments, 1965 ff 8020j, at
6031.
13" CCH EMPLOYMENT PRAc. GuiDE, Federal Laws, 1966 17,252 at
7366.
140 110 CONG. REc. 12297 (daily ed. June 4, 1964); 110 Coxa. Rc. 6986
(daily ed. April 8, 1964).
"'-78 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(g) (1964); 110 CoNG. REC 12298
(daily ed. June 4, 1964).
'42 110 CoNG. REc. 12298 (daily ed. June 4, 1964).
143 Ibd. "The proposed change does not involve any substantive change in
the title. . ..It means simply that the respondent must have intended to
discriminate." The United States Supreme Court has taken a liberal approach
toward the necessity of requiring proof of intent in discrimination cases.
See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 227-28 (1963) (proof of
intent may be inferred from inherently discriminatory acts); Radio Officers'
Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 44-45 (1954) (a person is held to intend the
foreseeable consequences of his conduct).
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Due to the requirement of intent, proof of good faith or
ignorance of the law may negate any relief under Title VII,'" but
in situations where the innocent discrimination results from a "pat-
tern or practice" the court should order that these actions cease
in the future.
(2) Remedying Racial Imbalances
The proponents of the Act often stated that minority groups
need not be given preferential treatment in order to remedy existing
racial imbalances in employment. 45 But, as a result of persisting
doubts, a section was added which eliminates the possibility of
retroactive application of Title VII.1'4 In practice, however, the
very existence of the law may result in pressures to increase the
percentage of minority group representation. Furthermore, any
deliberate attempt to maintain an existing racial imbalance will
violate the Act.'4 7 For example, where waiting lists for union
membership or apprenticeship training were, prior to the effective
date of Title VII, maintained on a discriminatory basis, the con-
tinued use of such lists may be held an unlawful employment
practice., 1
(3) Bona Fide Seniority Systems
The statute definitively states that it is not an unlawful employ-
ment practice for an employer to maintain different terms, conditions
or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority
system. 49 Thus, seniority rights that exist pursuant to a collective
bargaining agreement made prior to the effective date of the Act
remain intact. °5 0 This would be true even if white workers had
attained their seniority due to past discrimination against Negroes.' 5'
Contrariwise, any act based upon a seniority rule which is
inherently discriminatory would violate Title VII. 52  Moreover,
despite the proscription against preferential treatment, the federal
144 See Berg, supra note 133, at 71.
'145 110 CONG. REc. 12297 (daily ed. June 4, 1964).
46 78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-Z(j) (1964).
147 110 CONG. REc. 6986 (daily ed. April 8, 1964).
' "Id. at 6992.
'49 78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964). Another section of the
Act states that it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for a labor
union to refer for employment members on the basis of religion, sex or
national origin in instances where religion, sex or national origin is a bona
fide occupational requirement. 78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(e) (1964).
However, it is significant to note that this section does not grant an exemp-
tion on the basis of race or color.
150 110 CoNG. Rsc. 6986 (daily ed. April 8, 1964).
'.5'Id. at 6992.
'15
2 Id. at 6986.
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courts may be able to order that a Negro, who has been deprived
of seniority in the past because of discrimination, be allowed to enter
into any job classification for which he can qualify.,5 3
The application of Title VII to seniority rights based upon
discriminatory collective bargaining agreements is of crucial import-
ance, and the federal courts would do well to follow the standard
set by the Commission in one of the first problems it mediated. 54
That situation involved the merger of racially separate and function-
ally related seniority lines which had restricted Negroes to certain
jobs in a company. The company first proposed that the dual
seniority lines be horizontally merged to form a single line based
upon the wage scale. This would have placed the Negroes at the
bottom of the line and would have limited their movement up until
the white workers had first progressed. The Commission rejected
this plan and put forward the following proposal which was
accepted: (a) formally segregated lines should become intermeshed
or dovetailed horizontally, based upon job classification; (b) every
job classification in the line should be open to Negroes and whites
without discrimination; and (c) job rates should be non-discrim-
inatory. Thus, the new line of promotion would be based solely
upon the skill required in each of the jobs in the line of pro-
gression. "55
(4) Professionally Developed Ability Tests
In 1964, a finding by the hearing examiner of the Illinois FEPC
that a Negro applicant for a job was not accorded equal employment
opportunity caused much concern in the United States Senate. 56
The examiner concluded that an aptitude test which did not take
cultural deprivation into account was discriminatory 57  Subse-
quently, an amendment was added to Title VII which provides
that it shall not be an unlawful employment practice to act upon
the results of a "professionally developed" ability test so long as
it is not used for the purposes of discrimination. 58
What constitutes a "professionally developed" ability test is
not easily discernible. During the Senate debate over this provision,
53 It has been suggested that seniority terms should not apply to an older
Negro who has been deprived of employment opportunities due to past dis-
crimination. See Hickey, Government Regulation of Union Racial Policies,
7 B.C. INDUs. & Commn. L. REv. 191, 221-22 (1966).
154 CCH EmPLOYMENT PAc. GuiDE, New Developments, 1965 8032, at
6051.
'55 Ibid.
156The report of the hearing examiner is reprinted at 110 CONG. REc.
5476-79 (daily ed. March 19, 1964).
157,Ibid.
158 78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(h) (1964). -
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and in response to objections that it would be unlawful for an
employer to use qualifications tests based upon verbal skills and
other factors which might relate to environmental conditioning of
the applicant, Senator Clark stated: "The employer may set his
qualifications as high as he likes, and may hire, assign, and promote
on the basis of test performance."'5 9 Although this statement would
indicate a grant of broad discretion to labor unions in the use of
ability tests for entrance qualification, other factors would appear
to limit this discretion. 0°
A recent study has undermined traditional aptitude tests which
place heavy emphasis on verbal skills.' 6' The study concluded that
environmental and cultural background affects performance on many
approved intelligence quotient examinations because these tests are
geared to the abilities of white middle-class applicants. In addition,
further experimentation showed that test performances of Negroes
increased substantially on non-verbal examinations. Thus, a
federal court could interpret "professionally developed" to mean that
examinations must provide for cultural and environmental differences
between applicants in certain instances.
Effective Date and Coverage
Title VII was enacted into law July 2, 1964, and, in general,
became effective July 2, 1965.162 To be subject to the Title a union
must be engaged in an industry "affecting commerce." A labor
organization is such an industry if: (1) it has one hundred or
more members during the first year after the effective date of
Title VII, seventy-five or more during the second year, fifty or
more during the third year, or twenty-five or more thereafter ;163 and
(2) it is the certified, recognized, or actual bargaining representative
of employees in an industry affecting commerce. 6 There is no
minimum membership limitation where a labor union operates a
hiring hall.165
The gradual application of Title VII, along with the many
concessions granted the individual states, reveals a congressional
intent that local agencies first be given an opportunity to eliminate
discrimination in employment. The basis of this approach is the
:59 110 CONG. REc. 6997 (daily ed. April 8, 1964).16 0 Intent to discriminate may be inferred if a Negro applicant is required
to meet high standards that are in no way related to the employment skills
necessary.261 N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1966 § 1, p. 25, col. 1.
162 See note appended to 78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
16378 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(e) (2) (1964).
16478 Stat 253, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(e) (1-5) (1964).
16578 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C. § 2090e(e) (1) (1964).
NOTES
hope that state FEPCs will be induced to attack empldyment dis-
crimination lest the federal government intervene.16
CONCLUSION
The Limits of the Law
Although the success or failure of Title VII in preventing
racial discrimination by labor unions will depend, to a large extent,
upon the affirmative action taken by the Commission and the
Attorney General, of greater significance may be the attitude of the
federal courts. The "spirit" as well as the letter of the law must
be obeyed in order to eliminate established regulations and customary
practices of discrimination which have excluded many minorities
from equal employment opportunities. As cases are decided, one
question that will have to be answered by the courts is whether it
is within the judicial province to enforce the "spirit" of Title VII,
or whether this task might best remain an educative function.
The employment situation of the Negro mandates an immediate
response by the courts. Hopefully, a positive approach will be taken.
366 Affirmative action on the state and local level since the passage of
Title VII has been favorable. For instance:
(a) Six states have enacted FEP laws which provide for enforcement
agencies. CCH EMPLOYMENT PRAc. GUIDE, Employment Discrimination, 1965
1254 at 654-55.
(b) Kentucky enacted a comprehensive Civil Rights Act in 1966. N.Y.
Times, Jan. 26, 1966, p. 16, col. 2.
(c) On March 20, 1966, the chairman of the New York City Commis-
sion on Human Rights stated that he had given the building trade unions a
deadline of a week to file reports on what progress they had made in inte-
grating their membership and apprenticeship programs. N.Y. Times, March
21, 1966, p. 1, col. 3. The president of the building trade. unions, upon the
expiration of the one week period, announced that he had- no reports to give.
N.Y. Times, March 28, 1966, p. 20, col. 1.
(d) The president of the New York Building and Construction Trades
Council stated that Negroes and Puerto Ricans were needed and welcome in
the building trades. He stated that "we don't want the minority groups to
think this is just talk. Anyone in the building trades who doesn't want to
cooperate, we'll knock them into line." N.Y. Times, March 13, 1966, p. 75,
col. 3. In addition, many organizations undertook voluntary action to alleviate
the employment condition of the Negro:
(a) The AFL-CIO announced-that it will spend $10,000 a year for
the next three years in order to train Negroes to pass union apprentice-
ship tests. N.Y. Times, Feb..23, 1966, p. 24, col. 1.
(b) Many Law Students Civil Rights Research Councils have been
created. Time, May 21, 1965, p. 64'
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